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Abstract
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of 
the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) 
in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there 
is the closed research reactor in Espoo with nuclear fuel at the site, as well as a dozen 
minor nuclear material holders in Finland. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the construction site of the 
Olkiluoto 3 unit and installed safeguards instrumentation before the first fuel delivery that 
took place in 2017.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that 
nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international 
agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the 
international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In 
addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
 The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2017 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which 
has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is 
approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did 
they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2017. By means 
of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection 
days.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related 
activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such 
positive political action is that the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
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Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and able to provide assurance to 
all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The 
FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task as demonstrated once during 2017.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2017 was 
focused on nuclear material control: in particular, standard operational procedures were 
addressed within the nuclear regulator departments. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the 
new nuclear materials database was developed in this context. Due to the need to regulate 
the construction of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository 
site, safeguards instrumentation was under development, in particular the passive gamma 
emission tomography for the verification of spent fuel.
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for 
authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or 
nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects 
in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. In 2017, the partnerships programme between King 
Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and STUK continued supporting the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory 
authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme.
STUK-B 222
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Preface
Every year, STUK prepares the report on Implementing Nuclear Non-Proliferation in 
Finland. The main task of the report is to inform and share experiences with colleagues 
and interested parties on safeguards implementation.
The report was restructured in 2016–2017 to correspond the reader survey of 2016. In 
this new setting, Chapter 2 is shortened but kept in order to present the Finnish system 
and the relevant stakeholders to new readers in a concise way. Chapter 3 is presents 
the safeguards activities immediately after the introductory part, and development 
work and other activities are dealt with later in the report. STUK’s activities with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear disarmament are included in report.
The report was compiled by the staff member of the Safeguards Section of STUK. The 
inspectors in the office have specific oversight tasks and duties towards individual 
operators and stakeholders, so all staff members contribute to the reporting. The 
responsible officers for nuclear material holders are Henri Niittymäki for Loviisa NPP, 
Timo Ansaranta for Olkiluoto NPP, Tapani Honkamaa for the new Olkiluoto 3 unit, Mikael 
Moring and Olli Okko for the encapsulation plant and geological repository in Olkiluoto, 
Marko Hämäläinen for the Hanhikivi project, Henri Niittymäki and Olli Okko for the 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, and Timo Ansaranta and Henri Niittymäki for 
minor holders. There are deputy arrangements in place in order to ensure instant duplicate 
knowledge. Not all the necessary actions and responsibilities, such as licensing and 
approvals, are covered in this list of facility-specific tasks.
In addition, there are several additional tasks, which the Support Programme to the IAEA 
contributes to the international safeguards R&D work. Mr Honkamaa acts as support 
programme coordinator and prepares its annual report and the highlights in this report. 
Mr Moring is responsible for the Finnish National Data Centre to the CTBTO and, of 
STUK’s other departments, Kari Peräjärvi contributes to GICNT and IPNDV activities 
included in this report. At the end of 2017 the domestic non-proliferation co-operation 
between ministries and STUK was strengthened by nominating Elina Martikka to 
continue as International Cooperation Manager, while Marko Hämäläinen took over the 
Safeguards Section as the section head. In the end of the year the assistant Ritva Kylmälä, 
who took care of the supporting activities of the inspections and other activities in the 
Section, retired. The contents of this annual report can be expected to the reflect these 
changes in future. Comments and suggestions are welcome to improve the content and 
normativity of the report.
The Editor
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The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nucle-
ar safeguards, is a prerequisite for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in Finland. In order for Finland 
to have a nuclear industry, most of which consists 
of nuclear energy production, it must be ensured 
that nuclear materials, equipment and technology 
are used only for their declared peaceful purposes. 
The basis of nuclear safeguards is the national 
system for the regulatory control of nuclear mate-
rials and activities. Nuclear safeguards represent 
an integral part of nuclear safety and nuclear se-
curity and are applied to both large- and medium-
sized nuclear industry and to small-scale nuclear 
material activities. Along with the safeguards, the 
regulatory process for nuclear non-proliferation 
includes transport control, export control, border 
control, international cooperation, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials 
and activities that can lead to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear 
materials accountancy, control, security and the 
reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The 
main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards 
system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, 
often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” 
and the state authority, STUK. A licence holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the 
state authority shall provide the regulatory control 
to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the require-
ments. The control of nuclear expert organisations, 
technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-
proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a grow-
ing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish 
legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as 
users of nuclear energy.
1 Implementation of nuclear 
non‑proliferation in Finland
Finland has quite significant nuclear power 
production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear mate-
rials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor 
in Espoo with nuclear materials, as well as a dozen 
minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Most of 
the applied nuclear research and development ac-
tivities are carried out to improve the maintenance 
and safety of the nuclear power plants.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted with the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation).
One new agreement on cooperation in peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy for Finland entered into 
force in 2017. The agreement on cooperation in 
scientific and applied research, exchange of sci-
entific and technological information, transfer of 
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment 
and technology as well as the provision of relevant 
technological consultancy and services was signed 
10
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with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2015. This 
agreement was ratified on 3 June 2017.
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA entered into force 
(INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When Finland 
joined the EU (1 January 1995), this agreement 
was suspended and subsequently the Safeguards 
Agreement between the non-nuclear weapon 
Member States of the EU, the Euratom and the 
IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in Finland 
on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the Additional 
Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 
September 1998 with the other EU Member States 
and ratified it on 8 August 2000. The Additional 
Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, once 
all the EU Member States had ratified it. The 
scope and mandate for Euratom safeguards are 
defined in the European Commission Regulation 
No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member 
State and thereby subjected itself to the Euratom 
safeguards, a comprehensive national safeguards 
system was still maintained and further developed. 
The basic motivation for this is the responsibility 
assumed by Finland for its safeguards and security 
under the obligations of the NPT, and also to en-
sure fulfilment of the Euratom requirements.
The national safeguards derive their mandate 
and scope from the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree. The operator’s obligation to have a 
nuclear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK requirements into the Nuclear 
Energy Decree.
In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
in such a way that the Government Decrees on 
nuclear safety, nuclear waste management, emer-
gency preparedness and nuclear security were 
replaced by new STUK Regulations. Some general 
features were introduced from the old Government 
Decrees into the Nuclear Energy Decree, but most 
of the detailed requirements were included in the 
new STUK Regulations that entered into force on 
1 January 2016 parallel to the amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues detailed 
requirements (the YVL Guides) on safety, security 
and safeguards that apply to the use of nuclear en-
ergy. STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users 
of nuclear energy during all phases of the nuclear 
fuel cycle are set in YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory 
Control of Nuclear Safeguards. Areas covered in 
the new comprehensive guide include the obliga-
tions and measures stemming from the Additional 
Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement and from 
recent developments. All stakeholders must de-
scribe their own safeguards system in written form 
(as a nuclear materials handbook or safeguards 
manual), in order to ease their task of fulfilling 
their obligations and to guarantee the effective 
and comprehensive operation of the national safe-
guards system. In the new guide, there are also 
specific national requirements for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository. In 
general, nuclear safeguards control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weap-
ons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence including information se-
curity
•	 R&D	and	other	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	
fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
•	 design	 and	 construction	 of	 new	 nuclear	 facili-
ties.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish safe-
guards system are the authorities and stakehold-
ers. Undistributed responsibility for the safety, se-
curity and safeguards of the use of nuclear energy 
rests with the stakeholder. It is the responsibility of 
STUK as the state regulatory authority to ensure 
that the licence holders and all other stakeholders 
in the nuclear field comply with the requirements 
of the law and the nuclear safeguards agreements. 
To complement the national effort, international 
control is necessary in order to demonstrate cred-
ibility and the proper functioning of the national 
safeguards system.
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export control of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the supreme 
command and control of nuclear matters. MEAE is 
responsible for the legislation related to nuclear en-
ergy and is also the competent authority mentioned 
in the Euratom Treaty. Other ministries, such as the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, 
also contribute to the efficient functioning of the 
national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates 
the stakeholders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and inter-
national), handling, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use 
items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval and 
consultation process for inspectors from the IAEA 
and the European Commission.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with many 
other activities. STUK reviews the stakeholders’ 
reports (operational notifications, inventory re-
ports), inspects their accountancy, facilities and 
transport arrangements on site, and performs sys-
tem audits. STUK runs a verification programme 
for nuclear activities to assess the completeness 
and correctness of the declarations by the licence 
holders. STUK acts proactively in order to avoid 
or solve in advance any foreseeable questions to be 
raised by the international inspectorates. Nuclear 
safeguards on the national level are closely linked 
to other functions of nuclear materials control and 
non-proliferation: licensing, export control, border 
control, transport control, combating illicit traf-
ficking, physical protection of nuclear materials, 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and also Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear security 
objectives are closely complemented by safeguards 
objectives. For this reason, the research and regu-
latory units in the fields of safety, security and 
safeguards at STUK cooperate under the non-
proliferation framework. The scope of non-prolifer-
ation work is linked to many organisational units 
of STUK (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Framework to implement nuclear non-proliferation within STUK’s organisation.
Administration
Director General
Public Affairs
Safeguards 
Measurements and 
Technology
Environmental 
Radiation 
Surveillance 
and Emergency 
Preparedness
Nuclear
Security
Nuclear Safeguards
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Data Centre
Nuclear Waste 
and Material 
Regulation
Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation
Small Nuclear 
Material Holders
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Regulation
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The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section in the dif-
ferent duty areas is presented in Figure 2. Most of 
the working days are invoiced to the stakeholders. 
As seen in Figure 2, the duty areas are divided 
into those of direct oversight and inspections (basic 
operations), support functions including mainte-
nance, development work for the regulatory func-
tions and consultancy, including international co-
operation financed by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs or the European Union. The state budget-
ary funding constitutes only about 5% of the to-
tal funding of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards 
Section.
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an 
international domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards-relat-
ed cooperation and development efforts, and also 
participates in the European Safeguards Research 
and Development Association’s ESARDA’s working 
groups, executive board and the steering commit-
tee. The practices obtained at the current nuclear 
construction projects have emphasised the need to 
bring in the safeguards requirements at an early 
stage of facility design. The experience has been 
shared with the IAEA, several international fora 
and also in bilateral cooperation with several coun-
tries.
1.2.3 Licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national safeguards 
system are the licence holders and other users 
of nuclear energy – in nuclear terminology, often 
called the operators and other stakeholders. In the 
Finnish legislation, the term ’use of nuclear en-
ergy’ comprises a wide range of nuclear-related 
activities, such as those defined in the Addition 
Protocol. These stakeholders, in particular the li-
cence holders, perform key functions in the na-
tional safeguards system: control of the authentic 
source data of their nuclear materials in addition 
to accountancy for nuclear materials at the facil-
ity level for each of their material balance areas 
(MBA). Each licence holder or other user of nuclear 
energy must operate its safeguards system in ac-
cordance with its own nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual. The requirements of the 
Additional Protocol are integrated in the handbook 
to facilitate implementation of safeguards at the 
site, including the material balance areas. Other 
stakeholders too, as users of nuclear energy, are 
requested to have a safeguards manual to facilitate 
safeguards implementation. The nuclear materi-
als handbook or safeguards manual is part of the 
operator’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
In Finland, there are about 30 stakeholders 
responsible for nuclear material accountancy and 
control. The major material balance areas are list-
657; 43 %
80; 5 %
251; 17 %
529; 35 %
Distribution of working days
Direct oversight and inspections
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Expert services
Figure 2. The distribution of working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the various duty areas.
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ed in Table 1 and described more in detail below. 
Most of all nuclear materials in Finland reside at 
the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto. 
The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plu-
tonium) in Finland in 1990–2017 are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4. Currently there are six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant sites, the geological repository site 
in Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority and the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder or by other stake-
holder as groundwork, the European Commission 
adopts particular safeguards provisions (PSP) for 
that licence holder. PSPs are drawn taking op-
erational and technical constraints into account 
in close consultation with both the person or un-
dertaking concerned and the relevant member 
state. Until PSPs are adopted, the person or un-
dertaking shall apply the general provisions of the 
Commission regulation No 302/2005. A facility at-
tachment (FA) is prepared in cooperation with the 
IAEA for each facility to describe arrangements 
specific to that facility. The status of the regulatory 
documents for the Finnish material balance areas 
is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2017.
MBA, location BTC,  
last upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP,  
in force
FA,  
in force
Licence/DiP,  
in force  
(from/until)
SG Manual, 
approved 
WL0V, Loviisa 15.5.2017 S SF L0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 4.5.1998 No Operating,  
LO1 until 31.12.2027 
LO2 until 31.12.2030
Yes, 30.11.2012
W0L1, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0L2, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0LS, Olkiluoto 12.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operating, until 
31.12.2018
17.11.2016
W0L3, Olkiluoto 31.3.2016 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
No No Construction, granted 
17.2.2005
17.11.2016
W0LE, Olkiluoto 19.5.2017 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
No, included in 
WOLF manual 
W0LF, Olkiluoto 13.12.2017 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
9.6.2017
WFV1, Pyhäjoki 3.2.2017 No No No DiP, 1.7.2010 4.7.2014
WRRF, Espoo 31.12.2014 S SF VTT1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 9.7.1998 No Operating, until 
31.12.2023
12.4.2017
WNSC, Espoo 12.5.2017 Included 2017 
to SSF VTT1
No No Operating, until 
31.12.2026
14.11.2016
WFRS, Helsinki 1.3.2017 S SF STUK, 
8.7.2004
No No Not required  
(as an authority)
17.2.2017
WHEL, Helsinki 21.12.2016 S SF HYRL, 
8.7.2004
No No Operating, until 
31.12.2027
3.7.2017 
WKK0, Kokkola 30.5.2013 No No No Operating, until 
31.12.2024
18.6.2015
WNNH, Harjavalta 30.1.2017 No No No Operating, until 
31.12.2019
18.6.2015
WTAL, Talvivaara 14.9.2017 No No No Operating (pilot test) 
until 30.6.2023
6.11.2017
WDPJ, Jyväskylä 10.3.2017 No No No Operating, until 
31.12.2024
2.5.2017
Finnish material balance areas and their status as 31.12.2017. MBA (material balance area code), BTC (Basic Technical Characteristics, i.e. Design 
Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set by the European Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared 
by the IAEA), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 years).
14
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Figure 4. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2017.
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Figure 3. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2017.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat is located on Hästholmen Island 
in Loviisa on the southeast coast of Finland. This 
first NPP was built in Finland in the 1970s to host 
two VVER-440 type power reactor units. These two 
units share common fresh and spent fuel storages. 
For nuclear safeguards accountancy purposes, the 
entire NPP is counted as one material balance area 
(MBA code WL0V).
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then has been stored in the 
interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear 
legislation, which forbids the import and export of 
nuclear waste in general, including spent fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional 
Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1) com-
prises Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends 
to the main gate on the mainland. Particular 
Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which 
define the European Commission’s nuclear safe-
guards procedures for the facility, have been in 
force since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the 
Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been 
prepared by the IAEA for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0L3 and W0LS)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and op-
erates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto 
Island in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. 
The Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power 
reactor units and an interim spent fuel storage. 
Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity grid 
in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. There are three 
STUK-B 222
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active material balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS) at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Germany and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence 
to construct a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3 
in 2005. As a part of the licensing process, TVO’s 
plan for arranging the necessary measures to pre-
vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was ap-
proved by STUK. The European Commission has 
assigned the MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. TVO 
submitted the operating licence application to the 
Government in April 2016 with the aim of having 
the unit commissioned in 2018. The first fresh fuel 
for the first loading was received to OL3 in October 
2017.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1) as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol currently 
comprises the fenced areas around the reactor 
units, the spent fuel storage and the storage for low 
and intermediate level waste, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
by the IAEA for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1)
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 as a new nuclear 
power operator in Finland. The Government ap-
proved a Decision-in-Principle in 2010 for the new 
operator Fennovoima to construct a new nuclear 
power plant at a new site. The preliminary Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) was submitted to 
the European Commission in summer 2013, and 
the MBA code WFV1 was assigned to the future 
material balance area once the selection of the 
future Hanhikivi site at Pyhäjoki was decided. 
Fennovoima submitted the construction licence 
application to the Government in June 2015 and 
consequently, in September 2015, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy launched the pro-
cess to evaluate the application with the desired 
timeline at the end of 2017. The Hanhikivi site (ac-
cording to the Additional Protocol) will be declared 
stepwise as the project proceeds from a virgin 
green site to the preparatory work site and finally 
to the nuclear power plant. The current estimate 
is that the first Hanhikivi site declaration will be 
submitted in 2018.
VTT (MBAs WRRF and WNSC)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research re-
actor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in Otaniemi, 
Espoo. The research reactor was the first nuclear 
reactor built in Finland at the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT). In 2012, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy and VTT announced 
the plan to close down the reactor and to launch 
the decommissioning process. The reactor was shut 
down and made subcritical in 2015.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared by the IAEA for the research reac-
tor.
In contrast to this, a new building, the VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety, for experimental nu-
clear research is been built at the Espoo premises 
of VTT. The preliminary BTC for the new building 
was submitted to the Commission by the end of 
2014 and, consequently, the MBA code WNSC was 
assigned to the future material balance area in 
2015. In the new building, some of the experimen-
tal research that has been carried out in the build-
ing containing the research reactor is continued. 
STUK granted the operating licence in November 
2016 for the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, and 
nuclear materials were moved to the new building 
in 2017. The commissioning of the new laboratories 
advances stepwise. Both these decisions will have 
long-lasting effects, due to the need for licences, 
permits, contracts and environmental impact as-
sessment. This also affects safeguards, as the nu-
clear materials must be kept under the control 
of competent personnel in both material balance 
areas.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, currently 
consists of the whole building around the research 
reactor, although there are non-nuclear companies 
and university premises in the same building.
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Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction licence granted Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurised water reactor (PWR),
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 526/502 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Major nuclear installations in Finland
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Plant Supplemented  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit Decision-In-Principle approved net (MW) supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014  Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR),
    ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi nuclear facility project 
The planned facility under construction will consist of a surface facility for the encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel and a geological repository for disposal of the fuel in the underground at a depth of appr. 420 metres.
Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and geological repository
FiR 1 research reactor 
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel Triga fuel type  
TRIGA Mark II 250 kW March 1962– Reactor core consists Uranium–zirkonium-
research reactor  June 2015 of 80 fuel rods which hybrid combination:
   contain 15 kg of uranium 8% uranium
    91% zirkonium and 
    1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in  
March 1962. VTT stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed it in permanent shutdown.
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STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK), mainly materials no longer in use and 
hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK was 
founded in 1958 and has been located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the premises of STUK’s headquarters located in 
Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in 
the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula uni-
versity campus in Helsinki. In 2016 and also at 
the end of 2017 the University’s internal structure 
was reorganised and the current stakeholder is the 
Department of Chemistry.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building housing the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of Kokkola Chemicals facility’s 
cobalt purification process contain uranium, which 
qualifies these by-products as nuclear material. 
Kokkola Chemicals has an operating licence to pro-
duce, store and handle nuclear material. In 2013, 
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. acquired 
the ownership of the OM Group. The current op-
erator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility is 
located at Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel 
refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. 
The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded 
in 1995 and again in 2002. The refinery of Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta employs the technique of the sul-
phuric acid leaching of nickel products. Uranium 
residuals are extracted from the nickel products, 
for example from the Talvivaara mine. In March 
2010, STUK granted a licence to extract less than 
10 tonnes of uranium per year. The Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta company submitted the basic technical 
characteristics (BTC) to the European Commission 
in December 2010.
Terrafame Oy (MBA WTAL)
In 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd mining 
company announced its interest in investigating 
the recovery of uranium as a separate product 
from its sulphide ore body. The Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the 
European Commission in 2010, and the MBA code 
WTAL is assigned to the future uranium extrac-
tion plant that has been constructed as a sepa-
rate part of the mineral processing plant. The 
production of uranium was expected to commence 
in 2013. However, Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd filed 
for bankruptcy in November 2014. During 2015 
a new state-owned company Terrafame took over 
the mining operations at Talvivaara. At the end of 
2016, the use of the uranium extraction plant was 
again included in the mining and mineral process-
ing planning. STUK granted licence for small-scale 
pilot testing of the mineral processing techniques 
in December 2017 but the use of the extraction 
plant needs the operating licence to be granted by 
the Government. The application was submitted to 
the Government at end of October 2017 and is un-
der processing by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment. The MBA code WTAL is still 
kept available for possible future nuclear activities.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation-shielding material.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is owned 
by the nuclear power plant operators TVO and 
Fortum. Posiva has been excavating an under-
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ground rock characterisation facility called Onkalo 
at Eurajoki since 2004, and thus preparing for the 
construction of the disposal facility. In the IAEA 
safeguards approaches, it has been suggested that 
the geological formation should be under safe-
guards during the whole lifetime of the under-
ground facility. For this reason, Posiva was required 
to develop a non-proliferation handbook, such as a 
nuclear materials handbook, to describe its safe-
guards procedures and reporting system already 
before becoming a nuclear material holder. The li-
cence to construct the disposal facility was granted 
by the Government in November 2015. Based on 
the drawings presented in the application, the pre-
liminary BTCs were prepared for both facilities 
separately and submitted to the Commission in 
June 2013. The MBA codes assigned for the future 
facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation plant and 
W0LF for the geological repository. The installation 
without nuclear materials but with the two BTCs 
for these future Material Balance Areas consti-
tutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. 
The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area 
around the buildings supporting the construction 
of the facilities.
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders 
and suppliers that serve nuclear and other indus-
try are obliged to take care that non-proliferation-
sensitive technology does not get into the hands 
of unauthorised actors and thereby contribute 
to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the 
Additional Protocol extended the scope of safe-
guards to the non-proliferation control of nuclear 
programmes and fuel cycle-related activities. These 
also include research and development activities 
not involving nuclear materials, but are related to 
process or system development of fuel cycle aspects 
defined in the Protocol. Additionally, the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires 
every state to ensure that export controls, border 
controls, material accountancy and physical pro-
tection are efficiently addressed, and calls on all 
states to develop appropriate ways to work with 
and inform industry and the public regarding their 
obligations. The control of nuclear expert organisa-
tions to ensure the non-proliferation and peaceful 
use of sensitive technology and dual-use items is a 
growing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the stakeholders, universi-
ties, research organisations or companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol are 
under reporting requirements and export control. 
These stakeholders (the Technical Research Centre 
and a few universities) as users of nuclear energy 
are required to prepare the nuclear safeguards 
manual and to nominate responsible persons for 
nuclear safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
Safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission 
(Euratom safeguards) both have independent man-
dates to operate in Finland. These two interna-
tional inspectorates have agreed on cooperation, 
which aims to reduce undue duplication of effort. 
The operators report to the Commission as re-
quired by Commission Safeguards regulation No 
302/2005. It is the Commission’s task to control the 
licence holders’ accounting and reporting systems. 
The Commission shall draw up the particular safe-
guard provisions (PSP) to agree on the means of 
safeguards implementation taking account of the 
operational and technical constraints of the licence 
holder.
The IAEA safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, integrated together. While this should not 
lead to an increase in inspections, it should enable 
the IAEA to assure itself of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the 
number of IAEA routine interim inspections is de-
creasing. In contrast to this, the IAEA additionally 
performs 1–3 short-notice inspections per year in 
a state that has a number and type of nuclear in-
stallations similar to the situation in Finland. The 
IAEA has annually drawn conclusions confirming 
its confidence that all nuclear activities and mate-
rials are accounted for and are in peaceful use in 
Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
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defined in the state-level safeguards approach for 
Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 and 
2008. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) 
in September 2013, it was agreed that no unan-
nounced inspections with two hours’ notice time 
would be performed in Finland after the beginning 
of 2014. Thus, currently all short notice inspections 
are expected to take place with 48 hours’ advance 
notice (see infobox). STUK continues with annual 
routines consisting of approximately 40 field in-
spections, which enables the effective safeguards 
implementation of the international inspectorates.
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK must participate when the IAEA and 
Euratom are having inspections at Finnish fa-
cilities, so STUK has increased preparedness for 
short-notice and unannounced inspections and 
complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). 
Every weekday, one of STUK’s inspectors is pre-
pared to attend a possible IAEA of Euratom in-
spection.
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials 
and activities are the basis for state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated as a site representative, as 
per European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations in timely fashion to the Commission and 
the IAEA.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that 
nuclear materials and activities within the state 
are in accordance with the licence holders’ declara-
tions, and that there are no undeclared activities. 
Such methods can provide information on the 
identity of the nuclear materials and confirm that 
licence holders’ declarations are correct and com-
plete with respect to, for example, the enrichment 
of uranium and the burn-up and cooling time of 
nuclear fuel. The technical analysis methods in use 
are non-destructive assay (NDA), environmental 
sampling and satellite imagery.
1.5 Control of uranium and 
thorium production
Mining and mineral processing operations aim-
ing to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
regulatory control. In order to carry out these ac-
tivities, a licence and accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore and ore 
concentrates. These activities are also controlled 
by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European 
Commission. Mining and milling activities and the 
production of uranium and thorium must be re-
ported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA.
1.6 Licensing and export/import 
control of dual‑use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nu-
clear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to 
nuclear materials are under regulatory control. 
A licence is required for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear materials, components, 
equipment and technology suitable for producing 
nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items). The list of 
these other items is based on the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). 
The licensing authority is STUK. The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs is responsible for granting NSG 
Government-to-Government Assurances (GTGA) 
when necessary. The ministry usually consults with 
STUK before giving the assurances. The licence 
holder is required to provide STUK with a list of 
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)/Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	48	h	noti-
fication	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	48	h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	1	per	year 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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the above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the 
export, import and transfer of such items must be 
confirmed to STUK after the action.
Finland’s export control system is based on EU 
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
2009, which sets up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit 
of dual-use items. This regulation was amended 
in 2014. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group 
(NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regulated by the 
Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-use 
Goods. Authorisation is required to export dual-use 
items outside the European Union as well as for 
EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items, exclud-
ing non-sensitive nuclear materials. The licens-
ing authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Before granting an export licence, it also takes care 
of NSG Government-to-Government Assurances. 
The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on all applica-
tions concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.7 Control of nuclear 
material transport
The requirements for the transport of radioac-
tive material are set in the Finnish regulations 
on the transport of dangerous goods. The require-
ments are based on the IAEA Safety Standard 
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 
Material, SSR-6, and their purpose is to protect 
people, the environment and property from the 
harmful effects of radiation during the transport of 
radioactive material. Based on these regulations, 
STUK is the competent national authority for the 
regulatory control of the transport of radioactive 
material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste. Generally, a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically a few years. A transport plan 
and a transport security plan approved by STUK 
are mandatory for each consignment of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK 
before transportation. Furthermore, a package 
may be used for the transport of fissile nuclear 
material only after the package design has been 
validated by STUK.
1.8 Nuclear safeguards and security 
strengthen each other
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of radiation and nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards (3 S). All these three regimes have a 
common objective: the protection of people, society, 
the environment and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear se-
curity aims to protect nuclear facilities’ sensitive/
classified information, nuclear material and other 
radioactive material from unlawful activities, it is 
clear that the majority of the activities that aim at 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear ma-
terials and sensitive nuclear technology contribute 
to nuclear security. Physical and information secu-
rity measures at nuclear facilities and for nuclear 
materials including technology, sensitive informa-
tion and knowledge also contribute to non-prolifer-
ation by providing deterrence, detection and delay 
of and response to nuclear security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and de-
tection measures may supplement security meas-
ures through a deterrence effect.
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2 Safeguards activities in 2017
2.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
In 2017, STUK continued with national safeguards 
measures and activities with 62 inspection days 
and 42 inspections per material balance area as in 
the past. The stakeholders’ activities were licensed 
and inspected as appropriate, and inventory re-
ports and accountancies were verified systemically. 
The accumulation of nuclear material at the facili-
ties is shown in Figures 3 and 4 and the verified 
nuclear material inventories at the end of 2017 are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. In particu-
lar in 2017, STUK safeguards inspections focused 
on the NDA-measurements, in particular on de-
veloping the passive gamma emission tomography 
(PGET). However, the total number of STUK’s in-
spection days was relatively low in 2017 as pre-
sented in the charts in Figures 5 and 6.
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The implementation of the IAEA integrated 
safeguards since 2008 reduces the total number 
of annual routine inspections days of the interna-
tional inspectorates but includes short-notice ran-
dom inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA 
and European Commission inspections annually 
has been close to 20. The recent fluctuation has 
been due to the different design information veri-
fication activities at the disposal site during each 
of the years. In 2017, there was a minimal joint 
survey campaign to verify the design information 
of the repository, which also led to small number 
of annual inspection days although the testing of 
the PGET at the NPPs required some manpower. 
The development of inspections and inspection 
person days per material balance area is presented 
in Figures 5 and 6. Inspections by STUK, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the European Commission in 2017 are presented 
in Appendix 2.
The implementation of safeguards in Finland 
was addressed at several meetings with the IAEA 
and the European Commission. During the IAEA 
General Conference in September 2017, a trilat-
eral meeting was organised in Vienna. A trilateral 
meeting at least once a year is a good forum for 
every organisation to discuss, share information 
and to clarify state declarations. In addition, STUK 
experts met IAEA officials to discuss actual topics 
like implementing State Level Concept at Finnish 
facilities in connection with other meetings or 
occasions in Vienna. Similarly, in addition to the 
inspections STUK continued with two annual safe-
guards meetings with each of the NPP operator’s 
staff members responsible for safeguards.
2.2 General safeguards activities
2.2.1 Additional Protocol Declarations
All licence holders sent their updated information 
about the sites for the national declaration, which 
is compiled by STUK, in time by 1 April. STUK 
submitted Finland’s annual Additional Protocol 
declaration updates to the IAEA on 15 May 2017 
as required. Additionally, STUK submitted the 
quarterly declarations on exports in February, May, 
August and November.
2.2.2 Approvals of new 
international inspectors
In 2017, a total of 8 IAEA and 9 Commission in-
spectors, newly appointed, were approved to per-
form inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland. 
Acceptance of 19 IAEA inspectors was in the pro-
cess at the end of 2017.
2.2.3 Nuclear dual‑use items, export licences
In 2017, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
20 export licences for NSG Part 1 items, 3 for 
exporting nuclear technology (nuclear informa-
tion) for a nuclear power plant to EU countries 
(Sweden, Germany, France, Great Britain) and 8 to 
the Russian Federation, licences to export software 
to Sweden (2), Italy (1), Japan (3) and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (1), and one for training of nuclear 
software to the representatives of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and one for training of nuclear soft-
ware to the representatives of Japan.
2.2.4 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2017, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to 
Finland from Germany, Sweden and the Russian 
Federation (Appendix 1, Table A1). In relation to 
these imports, STUK approved five transport plans 
and three transport packaging designs. STUK in-
spected fresh nuclear fuel transports in accordance 
with the inspection plan, i.e. two inspections were 
carried out in 2017. In addition, STUK made one 
extra inspection to transport measures with an as-
sistance of resident inspector.
2.2.5 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2017, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. Based on the document inspection findings 
and audit of TVO’s international nuclear material 
transfer accountancy and control carried out on 22 
December, STUK concluded that TVO has complied 
with its safeguards obligations when purchasing 
the nuclear fuel and managing its international 
nuclear material transfers. The other operators 
purchase fuel as an end-product, and thus their 
accountancy does not need to cover the purchase 
chain abroad. 
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2.3 Safeguards implementation 
at the stakeholders
2.3.1 The Loviisa nuclear power plant
In 2017, STUK granted one licence for exporting 
of nuclear waste (five spent nuclear fuel rods) for 
research purposes to Studsvik, Sweden. STUK also 
granted one license for import of nuclear dual-use 
item.
In total, STUK performed 8 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Loviisa NPP in 2017. Safeguards DIV 
inspection was carried together with IAEA and 
the Commission on 21–22 February. The routine 
refuelling outage of the Loviisa 1 reactor unit took 
place during the period 6–27 August 2017 and the 
outage of the Loviisa 2 reactor unit during the pe-
riod 2–19 September 2017. STUK, the IAEA and 
the Commission performed a Physical Inventory 
Taking (pre-PIT) inspection before the outages, 
on 26 July 2017. This inspection was carried out 
effectively within one working day, instead of the 
tradition to reserve a day and a half day at the 
facility for field activities. The Physical Inventory 
Verification (PIV) was carried out after the out-
age, on 26–27 September 2017. STUK identified 
the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and item-
counted the fuel assemblies in the loading ponds. 
The Loviisa 1 core was inspected on 17 August 
2017 and the Loviisa 2 core on 9 September 2017. 
Two additional inspections, together with the IAEA 
and the Commission were carried out to perform 
activities that the international inspectors did not 
perform in the pre- and post PIV inspections.
On the basis of its own assessment and that 
of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection re-
sults, STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP 
complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations 
in 2017.
In November, STUK performed FORK measure-
ments at the Loviisa spent fuel pond. In total, 39 
fuel elements and one dummy element were veri-
fied during the campaign.
2.3.2 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
In 2017 STUK granted three import licences to 
TVO for importing fresh nuclear fuel to the two 
operating units, 7 licenses to import nuclear dual-
use items and one for export of nuclear waste (four 
spent nuclear fuel rods) for research purposes to 
Studsvik, Sweden. TVO updated its nuclear ma-
terials handbook with the aim of improving the 
import control of dual-use items. The update was 
approved by STUK.
STUK approved the qualification application 
for a new person to be appointed as the deputy 
safeguards responsible person for the Olkiluoto 
power plant.
The operating reactor units Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
and the spent fuel storage of the TVO Olkiluoto 
power plant were subject to 17 safeguards inspec-
tions. In addition, the accountancy of the ura-
nium batches in the TVO possession abroad was 
inspected. STUK performed in cooperation with 
the European Commission and the IAEA the in-
spections that comprise the physical inventory 
verification of the reactor units and the spent fuel 
storage both before and after the annual outages 
on 19–20 April and 12–13 July, respectively. STUK 
performed the core verification inspection of both 
reactor units before the reactor core lid was closed. 
In 2017, the outage was delayed so that the core 
verification at unit 2 took place on Sunday even-
ing 9 July, while the already postponed physical 
verification and design information verification of 
unit 3 were scheduled for weekdays of that week. 
Therefore, the PIV at unit 2 was carried separately 
on 25 July instead of the planned June.
In addition, STUK performed a core verification 
inspection in connection of the unscheduled outage 
caused by fuel leakage in the reactor unit 1 on 24 
October 2017. This outage also generated the need 
for an extra physical inventory verification inspec-
tion by the European Commission, the IAEA and 
STUK on 7 November. STUK performed further 
two interim safeguards inspections in the reactor 
units and the spent fuel storage. STUK took part 
in the random interim inspection initiated by the 
IAEA in the spent fuel storage, together with the 
European Commission.
In Olkiluoto 3 unit, Euratom and STUK per-
formed inspections on 16 March and 30–31 May 
2017 with the purpose of installation of surveil-
lance equipment. The annual design information 
verification inspection at the Olkiluoto 3 unit was 
carried out by the IAEA, EC and STUK on 11 July 
2017. During this inspection the functionality of 
surveillance equipment was verified. This verifica-
tion was also required by STUK as a precondition 
for fresh fuel receipt. The surveillance equipment 
was switched on before the first consignment of 
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fresh fuel entered in the Olkiluoto 3 unit which 
took place in October.
In April 2017 the IAEA, EC and STUK per-
formed a Passive Gamma Emission Tomography 
(PGET) measurement campaign at the Olkiluoto 
NPP unit 1. The measurements also served the 
purpose of PGET development. During the cam-
paign, 20 fuel objects including one rod container 
were measured and verified as spent fuel at pin-
level.
2.3.2 The Hanhikivi nuclear 
power plant project
The Government granted a Decision-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
STUK initiated negotiations with the operators 
and the Commission as well as with the IAEA in 
2011 to prepare for the implementation of safe-
guards in good time simultaneously with the facil-
ity development. As a consequence, the company 
could request the vendor organisations to facili-
tate safeguards implementation; for example, to 
improve proliferation resistance and facilitate nu-
clear material verification and surveillance at the 
future plant. In the meantime, Fennovoima created 
an organisation for safeguards and prepared for 
the implementation of safeguards.
One of the first steps in the construction pro-
cess is the control of nuclear technology, such as 
sensitive information obtained from the bidding 
companies. It was obvious that the first version of 
the nuclear materials handbook should focus on 
the current needs to control the nuclear technol-
ogy and dual-use equipment, so STUK approved 
Fennovoima’s safeguards manual “Fennovoima 
Managements System: Nuclear Materials Manual” 
as early as in 2014. New version of the manual 
was submitted for approval in October 2017 and 
is under review in STUK. The preliminary design 
information was already submitted in 2013 and 
updated in 2015. Fennovoima submitted the Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) for the first time 
in May 2017.
The First Safeguards by Design (SbD) meet-
ing between Fennovoima, plant supplier, STUK, 
EC and IAEA was organised in Vienna on 4–5 
October 2017. During the meeting Fennovoima and 
plant supplier presented the status, milestones 
and organisations of the Hanhikivi-1 Project. The 
international inspectorates presented their general 
views of safeguards. The IAEA also presented the 
safeguards equipment they are using for verifica-
tion and surveillance. Later in the meeting the 
practical design features were discussed in more 
depth. Fennovoima and the plant supplier have 
provided questions in advance and these were 
discussed. The conclusion was that Fennovoima 
will provide the updated BTC to the EC as soon 
as the layout has been frozen. After that the next 
SbD meeting can be arranged. If needed, technical 
meetings can be arranged in between. Also, de-
tailed questions can be made by the Fennovoima or 
plant supplier to the inspectorates if a need arises.
Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear technol-
ogy with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that 
awareness and preparedness for safeguards proce-
dures are at an adequate level in the new organisa-
tion preparing for the new NPP project and that 
Fennovoima fulfilled its current safeguards obliga-
tions in 2017.
2.3.4 VTT
At the Technical Research of Finland (VTT) the 
preparations for licensing decommissioning of the 
research reactor continued. and those for the com-
missioning of the new building for nuclear safety 
research continued in 2017. The safeguards manu-
als for the R&D work, possession of safeguardable 
information, practices at the research reactor and 
the research building were assessed in 2016, and 
a few requirements and recommendations were 
made with a deadline in early 2017. The updated 
safeguards manuals were approved in March 2017 
for R&D work and in April 2017 for the research 
reactor.
 On 20 June 2017 VTT submitted an applica-
tion addressed to the Government to decommission 
the FiR1 reactor. STUK and VTT responsible per-
sons met regularly during the year and discussed 
future actions to ensure appropriate safeguards 
procedures. The responsible manager changed and 
former a deputy took over the responsibilities in 
2016, and the appointment of the new deputy was 
approved in 2017.
VTT submitted an application for the operating 
licence of the Centre for Nuclear Safety in summer 
2016. The licence based on the Nuclear Energy 
Act was granted by STUK in November 2016, and 
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the activities started in 2017 by moving the small 
amounts of nuclear material used in the laborato-
ries located in the reactor building. Both buildings 
having separate material balance areas (MBA) 
were included in the updated site declaration in 
2017.
STUK and the Commission verified the nu-
clear material inventories of VTT’s both MBAs on 8 
June 2017. STUK carried out a system inspection 
including radiation safety and security considera-
tions for the commissioning of the new laborato-
ries on 22 November at VTT. The IAEA and the 
Commission carried out environmental sampling 
on 29 November in order to have a baseline before 
the commissioning of the hot cells installed in 
the research building (see Figure 7). During this 
inspection, the BTC was requested to be updated 
in early 2018 to have clarifications for the account-
ancy procedures.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that VTT complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2017.
2.3.5 STUK
STUK Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section veri-
fied the physical inventory, during the inspection 
on 26 October 2017. During this inspection STUK 
was required to make a re-measurement of a nu-
clear material item it had previously received as 
a domestic transfer. It can be concluded that the 
operating unit at STUK fulfils the requirements 
for national safeguards arrangements.
2.3.6 University of Helsinki
The premises of the laboratory of radiochemistry 
at the University of Helsinki were renovated in 
2016. After the renovation work STUK carried out 
its safeguards inspection in December 2016 and 
its radiation safety inspection to the premises on 
23 November 2017. In this context too, the nuclear 
material inventory was verified. Before that, the 
IAEA carried out a Complementary Access to the 
site on 27 April 2017. The laboratories were visited 
and Environmental samples taken. One of the dis-
cussion topics was the definition of “hot cells”. It 
became obvious that the manufacturer’s commer-
cial terminology for hot cells is not corresponding 
to that of the IAEA’s terminology. The operator was 
advised to use the term of shielded cells in safe-
guards communication.
As the operating licence expired at the end of 
year, the new application to renew the licence was 
processed at STUK and a new licence was granted 
for 10 years. The University structure is again re-
organised, but the stakeholders name and address 
Department of Chemistry, University of Helsinki 
in English have remained.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results and the renewal of the operating licence 
on 5 December 2017, STUK concluded that the 
University of Helsinki complied with its nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2017.
2.3.7 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2017, STUK inspected the reports from the mi-
nor nuclear material holders. The minor holders 
were requested to prepare their nuclear materi-
als handbooks as required in the new STUK re-
quirements, i.e. in the Guide YVL D.1. In total, 8 
handbooks prepared by the minor holders were 
approved in 2017.
In December 2016 STUK received a special 
nuclear safeguards report from the University of 
Figure 7. IAEA inspector carries out environmental 
sampling in the clean hot cells to before their commis-
sioning (Picture from E. Myllykylä, VTT).
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Jyväskylä Department of Physics on a lost ura-
nium sample. The special report was reviewed, and 
the measures taken by the operator to prevent re-
occurrence of the event were introduced to the nu-
clear materials handbook. The inventory and prac-
tices at the University of Jyväskylä were inspected 
by STUK and Commission on 30 November 2017.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2017.
2.3.8 Front‑end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola report 
monthly to the Commission and STUK. The extrac-
tion of uranium from industrial purification pro-
cesses is considered to be a pre-safeguard activity 
and therefore not subject to IAEA safeguards. In 
2016, STUK and the Commission inspected the in-
ventories and accountancy practices at both of the 
operators. During 2017 no new uranium extraction 
took place and thus no site inspections took place. 
The operators reported according to safeguards 
requirements about their planned activities and 
monthly inventories. On the basis of its assess-
ment, STUK concluded that these operators com-
plied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2017.
During early 2011, STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to 
begin uranium production as a by-product at the 
Talvivaara nickel mine. During 2011–2013, the 
uranium extraction plant was built as a new 
unit in the mineral processing complex, but the 
progress was halted due to economic and environ-
mental reasons. In June 2017 the new operator 
Terrafame Ltd. applied for an operating licence 
to carry out pilot tests to analyse the processing 
techniques to be applied in the uranium extraction 
plant. The pilot tests were licensed by STUK like 
other minor holders possessing small amounts of 
natural uranium in December 2017. Thus, the nu-
clear safeguards manual and responsible persons 
for nuclear materials accountancy were approved 
by STUK before granting the licence. The licence 
application for the operation of the uranium ex-
traction plan was submitted to the Government 
in October 2017. The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment launched the process to evaluate 
the application with the desired timeline in June 
2018.
2.3.9 The disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel
The operator Posiva applied for the nuclear con-
struction licence for the disposal facility in 2012. 
STUK assessed the application during 2013–2015 
together with the Commission and the IAEA in 
order to clarify and facilitate safeguards measures 
for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
The requirement document for the IAEA/EC equip-
ment to be installed in the encapsulation plant was 
prepared and finalised in 2014. This requirement 
document was referenced in the STUK assessment 
of the licence application.
In 2017 Posiva updated the BTCs both for the 
encapsulation plant and the geological repository. 
In particular, the layout of the encapsulation plant 
was updated in May 2017. As a consequence, the 
requirement document for the safeguards equip-
ment to be installed at the encapsulation plant has 
to be updated by the IAEA and the Commission. 
The changes in the layout were discussed jointly 
in June at STUK. This “Safeguards-by-Design” 
process can be expected to continue during the pro-
gress of the facility.
Posiva updated its safeguards manual in au-
tumn 2017 mainly to correspond to the new phase 
of licensed construction and new reporting prac-
tices. STUK approved the update with some minor 
requirements on the reporting procedures. A new 
deputy for the responsible person for safeguards 
arrangements at the disposal facility was approved 
by STUK in December.
The underground construction for technical 
servicing parts such as parking halls, personnel 
shafts, etc. continued during 2017, but also the 
construction of nuclear parts where nuclear mate-
rial will be stored or transferred in the installation 
was launched by excavating access tunnel to the 
canister shaft, canister transfer tunnels, canister 
storage, etc. There were more than 10 active con-
current construction locations underground. At 
ground level, the foundation works for the encap-
sulation plant continued.
In 2017 STUK carried out two interim safe-
guards inspections at the site. The IAEA and 
Commission carried out design information veri-
fication on 18–20 July. On the basis of its assess-
ment and inspection results, STUK concluded that 
Posiva complied with its nuclear safeguards obliga-
tions in 2017.
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2.3.10 Other stakeholders
Research organisations and universities provided 
their annual declarations on research and devel-
opment work to STUK. After its review, STUK 
prepared the annual declaration based on the 
Additional Protocol to the IAEA within the time 
limit of 15 May.
STUK received in December 2016, a special 
safeguards report from RAOS Project Oy, the 
Hanhikivi plant designer, on the unauthorised 
import of nuclear information. The report describ-
ing the measures taken by stakeholders to prevent 
reoccurrence of this kind of events in future was 
approved by STUK in 2017.
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3 Development work in 2017
3.1 Development of working practices 
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by the 
Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of STUK 
cover all typical measures of the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC), and many other activities besides. Nuclear 
safeguards on the national level are closely linked 
with the other functions of nuclear materials con-
trol and non-proliferation: licensing, export con-
trol, border control, transport control, combating 
illicit trafficking, the physical protection of nuclear 
materials, and monitoring compliance with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
The continuous analysis of the developments in the 
involved fields of both technology and politics is a 
daily, multidisciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear 
Materials Section.
In 2017 the number of staff member in the 
Nuclear Material Safeguards Section was six in-
spectors, assistant and section head. In the end of 
the year the assistant retired. At the same time, the 
section head was nominated as the International 
Cooperation Manager in the Department’s man-
agement. Thus, the Nuclear Materials Safeguards 
Sections is under reorganisation.
The renewal project of the nuclear material 
data base maintained at STUK (SAFKA) was 
finished in 2017. The database has been moved 
from a Microsoft Access platform to Microsoft 
SQL with a new web-based user interface. The 
work has been performed as an in-house project, 
utilising database and programming experts from 
STUK’s Department of Environmental Radiation 
Surveillance and Emergency Preparedness. 
SAFKA was taken into use in spring and run in 
parallel with the old database for a few months. In 
September updating of the old database stopped 
and SAFKA declared the official database for 
Nuclear Materials at STUK. In parallel with this, 
the quality management system, in particular the 
standard operational procedures at the Reactor 
Regulation and Nuclear Waste and Material 
Regulation departments of STUK were under revi-
sion. At the Nuclear Materials Section the updates 
included the revision of current procedures that 
were included in several documents and the adop-
tion of the new database. The issuance of these 
procedures was completed in 2017.
During the year STUK carried out preparatory 
works for the submission digital declarations using 
the Protocol Reporter 3 software in 2018. This was 
partly carried out under the support programme 
to the IAEA as many of internal development 
projects. A workshop was held in January 2017 in 
Helsinki together with Loviisa plant staff who pre-
pared the test package in March. The IAEA tested 
and evaluated the digital declaration site maps for 
their compatibility in the IAEA system.
As the licensed construction of the disposal 
facility began in 2016, the preparatory work at 
the authority was focused on timely implementa-
tion of safeguards, in particular the equipment 
infrastructure to be fitted to the encapsulation and 
disposal process. The development of the passive 
gamma emission tomography continued in coop-
eration with national experts at Helsinki Institute 
of Physics and also within the support programme 
to the IAEA. A meeting between the Operator’s ex-
perts and safeguards staff, STUK, Commission and 
the IAEA was also held in June 2017 in Helsinki 
at STUK’s premises. In addition, the geoscientific 
monitoring programme was updated for its safety 
relevance, and its applicability to STUK safe-
guards was re-assessed.
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3.2 Support programme to 
the IAEA safeguards
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The 
FINSP was established in May 1988. In 2017, 
FINSP was active in the areas of verification meth-
od development, development of safeguards guid-
ance to the IAEA Member States and in inspector 
training.
FINSP has organised NDA training for the 
IAEA inspectors also in 2017. A Spent Fuel 
Verification Training Course was held at the 
Loviisa NPP on 20–23 November 2017, with the 
cooperation of the NPP operator Fortum.
Disposal programmes for spent 
nuclear fuel and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards 
measures must be agreed on by all parties: fa-
cility designers, operators and the inspectorates. 
The implementation of safeguards measures 
has been discussed at several fora. The Experts’ 
Group Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) held its annual meeting in 
the Japan on 24–27 April 2017 as a joint Support 
Programme task. The main aim was to finalise 
ASTOR report which summarises the achieve-
ments obtained during the 10-year period of the 
ASTOR group. Several topical groups provided the 
IAEA with their draft reports mainly on potential 
methods that can be applied to safeguard geologi-
cal repositories. The report (STR-384) was pub-
lished by the IAEA in August 2017.
In 2017 the main achievement of FINSP was 
hosting two measurements campaigns in Loviisa 
(VVER 440 fuel) and Olkiluoto (BWR fuel) power 
plants, which proved the practical usability of 
Passive Gamma Emission Tomographer. The pro-
totype created in earlier task was upgraded for 
enhanced performance in detection time, reliabil-
ity and maintainability (see Figures 8–11). The 
campaigns, together with one campaign held in 
Ringhals, Sweden (PWR fuel) proved that PGET 
prototype meets or exceeds all user requirements 
set for the method. The IAEA approved the method 
for safeguards use in December 2017. IAEA plans 
to procure new units in the coming years and 
FINSP is supporting IAEA in this effort.
Figure 8. Passive Gamma Emission Tomographer in 
Olkiluoto, April 2017 (IAEA, STR 384)
Figure 9. Passive Gamma Emission Tomography image 
of Olkiluoto spent fuel rod rack declared to contain 
20 rods of different burn ups and cooling times. 
The declared data the predicted intensities coincide 
rather well with observed intensities. (Picture from 
C.Belanger-Champagne, HIP)
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FINSP is also coordinating the R&D efforts 
in Finland made in PGET. Helsinki Institute of 
Physics has an active research group developing 
the method forward, along with the IAEA and 
other researchers in this field. There are several 
areas where improvement can be made. Additional 
measurements are needed to fully understand the 
capabilities of the method. The preparation for 
campaigns in Finland are being planned for 2018.
3.3 International cooperation 
and services
The state’s regulatory authority plays an impor-
tant role in implementing safeguards at a national 
level, and also in contributing to and participating 
in the international fora to share experiences and 
interact with other parties. Participating in inter-
national events with a suitable contribution is also 
the best training for safeguards inspectors. The 
resources are limited, so the selection of the events 
is important.
 STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA) 
and has appointed Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups. A STUK expert con-
tinued with the chairmanship of the Verification 
Technologies and Methodologies (VTM) Working 
Group. STUK expert also provided a presentation 
at the INMM annual meeting.
STUK keeps in close contact with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories is strengthening cooperation be-
tween Finland and Sweden. In 2017, STUK and 
SSM continued with bilateral annual meetings in 
the framework of nuclear non-proliferation. The 
Nordic Society’s seminar on non-proliferation is-
sues was revoked and held in Sigtuna, Sweden 
on 7–8 November. The topic of the year, 20 years 
of Additional Protocol was addressed by having 
Nordic reflections and presentations also from the 
operators. The same topic was discussed also at the 
ESARDA Symposium in Düsseldorf as a roundta-
ble discussion and at the INMM meeting where the 
political history and process where reassessed by 
those persons involved in the past.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national cooperation.
In 2014, the partnership programme between 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and STUK was launched. The initiative is to give 
expert support to the establishment of the nuclear 
regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia. In the field 
of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safe-
guards and security experts carry out practical 
cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
Figure 10. Tomographic image of SVEA 96 BWR fuel 
with two pins missing.
Figure 11. PGET together with FORK in Loviisa NPP, 
February 2017.
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Table 2. Comparison of PGET and PNAR methods.
ASTOR NDA Focus Group Recommended PGET PNAR
Capable of pin level detection Yes No
Capable of verifying that the declared assembly 
is consistent with measured signatures
? Yes
Capable of measuring assembly neutron 
multiplication
No Yes
Capable of measuring all fuel assemblies at the 
measurement location and in the medium of 
interest (fresh water, borated water, air) 
Yes Fuel type specific hardware
Robust, low maintenance and have a low false 
alarm rate
? Yes
Difficult to trick with pin substitution System Attribute
Measure the weight of the assembly Load Cell Attribute
In 2016, two EU-funded projects were launched 
to give support to the nuclear regulators in 
Vietnam and Tanzania as these countries are aim-
ing at nuclear power and uranium mining, respec-
tively. The kick-off meetings were held in 2016 and 
the cooperation is scheduled to continue for at least 
2–3 years.
3.4 Final disposal and 
Gosser R&D project
The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, data 
security and other security arrangements and the 
safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons must be properly implemented at 
a national level. For this purpose, STUK launched 
GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards and 
Security) to finalise the Finnish concept for safe-
guarding the geological disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel in 2016. GOSSER gathers together the nec-
essary actions that have been done and that still 
need to be done to develop the cost-effective and 
functional safeguards concepts for the encapsula-
tion plant and for the geological repository. The 
project coordinates the activities between the 
IAEA Safeguards Support Programme including 
the ASTOR group, the safeguards implementation 
plans of the IAEA, the European Commission and 
STUK, and maintains the cooperation between 
STUK’s safety, security and safeguards sections.
GOSSER is divided in two sub-projects. The first 
sub-project is researching and developing NDA 
verification system for verification of spent fuel go-
ing to final disposal. It is commonly agreed that the 
fuel shall be verified in comprehensive manner and 
with the best available technology. PGET has for 
long be seen such a method, since it can detect the 
geometry and missing pins inside the fuel. In 2017 
GOSSER actively contributed to development of 
PGET verifier under coordination and cooperation 
of Finnish support programme (FINSP) and na-
tional research programme in Helsinki Institute of 
Physics funded by TEKES – the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation.
In addition, GOSSER took seriously the ASTOR 
recommendations that PGET alone is not suffi-
cient method to provide the adequate information. 
At the present development stage PGET provides 
quantitative image of the fuel. It does not therefore 
provide full information that the declared burn-up, 
history and cooling time of the fuel is consistent 
with measured signatures. Moreover, the signal 
provided by PGET does not directly provide proof 
that nuclear material is present in the fuel. This 
information can be provided by a method which is 
capable of measuring neutron multiplication in the 
assembly. According to the analysis it can be seen 
that Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) is 
a tool which complements the PGET nicely (Table 
2).
PNAR method is using the same detectors than 
FORK-detector, He3 tubes for neutron detection 
and ionisation chambers for gross gamma detec-
tion. Ionisation chamber is present for providing 
the possibility to perform FORK like analysis for 
the fuel. It is not needed for PNAR method as such. 
The PNAR measurement is done in two stages, 
both in multiplying and in non-multiplying condi-
tions. This can be achieved with a moving cadmium 
sheet. The ratio of the neutron measurements pro-
vides metrics to evaluate the multiplication in the 
assembly. More information is provided in STUK 
report by Tobin et. al. (see references).
STUK-B 222
33
In 2017 PNAR concept was designed and 
modelled. Report was electronically published in 
January 2018. The project is continuing and pre-
cise mechanical model of the instrument will be 
ready by February 2018. After that the prototype 
shall be built by the fall 2018. The plan is to use 
PNAR prototype in combination with PGET in 
Olkiluoto spent fuel storage in late 2018.
The other sub-project of GOSSER is to follow 
and analyse the work of other disciplines of the 
ASTOR Group’s work. These include technical 
needs for canister identification, containment and 
surveillance methods to be adopted at the new 
type of facility, design information verification pro-
cedures, safeguards-relevant data management, 
etc. Although these issues are dealt with while 
licensing the disposal facility in Finland, the in-
ternational developments are to be followed and 
actions taken if needed. During 2017, the safe-
ty-safeguards interface was reassessed owing to 
modification done in the monitoring programme at 
the Olkiluoto repository site by Pentti & Heikkinen 
2017.
3.4 GICNT – Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
founded in 2006, is a voluntary partnership of 88 
nations, 5 official observers, and co-chaired by the 
Russian Federation and the United States. The 
GICNT mission is to strengthen the global capac-
ity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear ter-
rorism by conducting multilateral activities that 
strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and 
interoperability of partner nations. The GICNT 
plenary meetings are organised every two years. 
At these meetings, the work programme for the 
coming two years is agreed. The previous plenary 
meeting was held in Tokyo in June 2017. At this 
meeting, Finland was elected to take the chairman-
ship of the Implementation and Assessment Group 
(IAG) and finished chairing the Nuclear Detection 
Working Group (NDWG).
During 2017, the work progressed as planned. 
GICNT’s IAG meeting was held in New Delhi, 
India in February. This was the primary planning 
meeting for the June Plenary in Tokyo. In March 
2017, NDWG organised a Magic Maggiore techni-
cal reachback workshop in collaboration with the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in 
Ispra, Italy. In October, NDWG organised a mul-
tilateral exercise in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During 
2017 GICNT was represented in three Border 
Monitoring Working Group Meetings. In addition, 
general GICNT presentation was given in the 
Nordic Society Seminar on safeguards and nuclear 
non-proliferation issues in Sigtuna, Sweden in 
November.
3.5 IPNDV – International 
Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarma-
ment Verification (IPNDV) was established on the 
initiative of the United States in 2014. IPNDV’s 
first phase ended in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 
November 2017. During the first phase of IPNDV 
the work was organised under three working 
groups:
1) Monitoring and Verification Objectives
2) On-site Inspections
3) Technical Challenges and Solutions
Finland participated in the work of all groups. All 
groups completed their assignments in time. Main 
results of the work are made publicly available 
in IPNDV’s www-pages (https://www.ipndv.org/). 
Deliverables were finalised in March and June 
working group meetings in Berlin, Germany and 
Geneva, Switzerland. End of the Buenos Aires 
Plenary meeting was devoted for the launching of 
second phase of IPNDV. Three new working groups 
were established. Second phase will continue until 
the end of 2019.
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4 National Data Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty (FiNDC)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and the qualitative improve-
ment of nuclear weapons, including the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. It will en-
ter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 
states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states par-
ticipated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following 
elements: the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), a consultation and clarification process, 
on-site inspections and confidence-building meas-
ures. The IMS is almost 90% ready and is provid-
ing data from more than 300 measuring stations 
all over the world to more than 1,200 organisa-
tions in more than 120 countries. In addition 
to monitoring compliance with the treaty, the 
data from the IMS is used in disaster mitiga-
tion. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO) is actively providing data 
to the global Tsunami Warning System and, since 
2012, the CTBTO has been a member of the Inter-
Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear 
Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor of the 
Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of 
the International Organisations (JPLAN) led by 
the IAEA. Within this framework, the CTBTO is 
responsible for gathering and providing close to re-
al-time radionuclide monitoring data to the IAEA 
and other participating organisations.
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionu-
clide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data re-
ceived from IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the 
IMS by providing support in radionuclide analyses 
and in quality control of the radionuclide station 
network. The third major national collaborator is 
the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti) and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) Status (31 December 2017)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 183
•	 Total	Ratifications	 166
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 36
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4.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
In 2017, the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish na-
tional interests.
4.2 The analysis pipeline is a well‑
established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The analysis pipe-
line is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped 
with an automated alarm system, to enable ef-
ficient and fully automated screening of the data. 
The IMS network is still developing, and the num-
ber of installed air filter stations was 70 at the end 
of 2017 (in the final stage there will be 80).
The number of IMS stations equipped with ra-
dioxenon measurement capabilities was 31 at the 
end of 2017. 25 IMS radioxenon systems were certi-
fied by the CTBTO at the end of 2017. Radioxenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification because xenon, as a noble gas, may also 
leak from underground tests, which seldom release 
particulate matter. The operational stations gen-
erated more than 1,000 gamma and beta-gamma 
spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline 
to handle. The pipeline is well-established and has 
been running stably for many years.
4.3 DPRK nuclear test detected in 2017
On 3 September 2017, DPRK performed an un-
derground nuclear test at its Punggue-ri test site. 
The test was by far the largest so far by DPRK 
and reached into the 100 Megaton range, mak-
ing it possible that this was a hydrogen bomb, 
although based on the yield estimates it can also 
have been a fusion boosted fission device or even a 
pure fission bomb. The test was registered within 
minutes and identified as a possible test by seismic 
monitoring both in Finland and at the PTS of the 
CTBTO. FiNDC participated in the clarification of 
the situation during the first hours and days after 
the tests and produced information bulletins to the 
Finnish Government based on information from 
the Institute of Seismology, the CTBTO and public 
sources. No radionuclides were detected in the IMS 
system that could be proven to originate from the 
test. However, there was a series of xenon detec-
tions in IMS stations that might be attributed to a 
release from the test site.
Xenon radioisotopes released from medical iso-
tope production facilities and NPPs are regularly 
measured all around the globe. Anthropogenic 
nuclides with CTBT relevance, mainly 99Tc, 131I 
from medical isotope production and 137Cs from 
Chernobyl and Fukushima fallout are regularly 
measured at some particulate stations. In 2017 
the Ru-106 release that was detected in several 
European national networks was also detected by 
the CTBT IMS network.
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5 Summary
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 62 inspection days and 
42 inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA 
and European Commission inspections annually 
has been close to 20. The implementation of the 
IAEA integrated safeguards since 2008 in force 
in Finland reduces the total number of annual 
routine inspections days of the international in-
spectorates but includes short-notice random in-
spections. In order to be present at all of the short-
notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had a daily 
on-call inspector.
In 2017, STUK performed 30 safeguards inspec-
tions on the material balance areas of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants (NPP), 9 at the Loviisa NPP 
and 21 at the Olkiluoto NPP. According to the 
IAEA state-level approach for Finland, two short-
noticed random inspection were carried out, one 
at the Loviisa NPP and one at the Olkiluoto spent 
fuel storage, and one complementary access to the 
Helsinki University site. The IAEA collected envi-
ronmental samples at the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety before the commissioning of the hot cells 
designed to study radioactive materials but coming 
under the definitions of the Additional Protocol. 
STUK performed one non-destructive assay meas-
urement campaign at both NPPs. These, in par-
ticular the passive gamma emission tomography 
(PGET) tests, were followed and performed by the 
IAEA and commission staff members raising the 
number of inspection days. The installation and 
testing of the surveillance cameras at Olkiluoto 3 
unit was performed by the Commission well before 
the receiving of the first nuclear fuel to the new 
reactor. At other facilities, the Commission took 
part in the accountancy inspection and physi-
cal inventory verifications at the VTT Research 
Reactor and Centre for Nuclear Safety and at 
University of Jyväskylä. The total number of safe-
guards inspections in 2017 was 42 for STUK, 21 for 
the Commission, and 19 for the IAEA. The IAEA 
sent its safeguards statements to the Commission, 
which amended them with its own conclusions 
and forwarded them to STUK. The conclusions by 
the Commission were in line with the IAEA’s re-
marks as well as with STUK’s own findings; there 
were no outstanding questions by the IAEA or the 
Commission at the end of 2017.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities, and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the stakeholders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA 
nor the Commission made any remarks, nor did 
they present any required actions based on their 
inspections. By means of their nuclear materials 
accountancy and control systems, the stakehold-
ers enabled Finland to fulfil its own obligations 
under the international agreements relevant to 
nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. STUK 
acts proactively and facilitated a meeting between 
the designers of the new Hanhikivi-1 unit and the 
IAEA staff members in Vienna in order to promote 
the safeguards-by-design process.
Among the major achievements in 2017 were 
the successful campaigns of PGET verification 
tool. The method is approved by the IAEA for 
safeguards use. The development of the method 
continues under FINSP and GOSSER project. The 
goal is to develop NDA system for final disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel.
In 2017, STUK's Nuclear Materials Safeguards 
Section cooperated closely with the IAEA in order 
to share experiences and train authorities’ staff in 
countries that are aiming at nuclear programmes, 
i.e. uranium production or nuclear energy. This 
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context was enlarged to Tanzania and Vietnam in 
EU-financed projects. The cooperation with Saudi 
Arabia continued in 2017.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps must be taken in the political 
arena, and an important prerequisite for positive 
political action is that the verification system of 
the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide as-
surance to all parties that it is impossible to make 
a clandestine nuclear test without detection. The 
FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the 
CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. While 
still incomplete, the verification system has clearly 
demonstrated its ability to detect nuclear tests, as 
unfortunately this was done once in 2017.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
EPGR
Encapsulation Plant and 
Geological Repository
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium, 20% 
or more of U-235
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
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IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, e.g. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management
IPNDV
International Partnership 
for Nuclear Disarmament 
Verification
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium, less 
than 20% of U-235
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEAE
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PNAR
Passive Neutron Albedo 
Reactivity
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
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SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
YVL Guide
Regulatory Guide on Nuclear 
Safety (STUK requirements 
on safety, security and 
safeguards, in Finnish 
Ydinvoimalaitosohje)
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Table A1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2017.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 100 17 415
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 Sweden 100 17 501
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 Germany 196 104 698
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 168 21 064
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2017
Table A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2017.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 072/500 183 005 801
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 210/636 203 164 988
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 196/0 104 698 0
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
7786/7786 1 311 612 11 174
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 6147/5197 715 799 6 755
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table A3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2017.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 183 005 – 801 –
W0L2 – 203 164 – 988 –
W0L3 – 104 698 – – –
W0LS – 1 311 612 – 11 174 –
WL0V – 715 799 – 6 755 –
WRRF 1 508.961 57.861 0.001 < 0.001 –
WNSC 0.282 2 220 - - 0.044
WFRS 1.842 0.537 396.3 0.010 2.370
WKK0 2 709.700 – – – –
WNNH 3 588.070 – – – -–
WHEL 10.826 0.294 0.005 0.002 1.079
Minor holders 0.907 0.00116  1 158.6 ~ 0  0.291
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta,  
WHEL = Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2017
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA/Location Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 21–22 February DIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
WL0V 20–24 February NDA measurements 1 1 1 5 5 5
W0L1, W0L2, 
W0LS, S SF OLK1 15 March Interim, site check 0 0 4 0 0 8
W0L3 16 March EC camera Installation 0 1 1 0 1 1
WL0V, S SF LOV1 20 March Interim, site check 0 0 2 0 0 2
W0LS 27–28 March Fuel history Cards (“NDA”) 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0LF, S SF POS1 29 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L2 3–4 April NDA measurements 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 11 April Random Interim Inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1, W0L2 19–20 April Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 4 2
WHEL 27 April Complementary Access 1 0 1 2 0 1
W0L1 30 April Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L3 30–31 May C/S installation 0 1 1 0 2 2
WRRF, WNSC 8 June PIV 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L2 9 July Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L3 11 July DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1, W0LS 11–12 July PIV 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0LF 18–20 July DIV 1 1 1 3 6 3
W0L2 25 July PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 26 July Pre-PIT 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 17 August Lo1 Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS 7 September SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 9 September Lo2 Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 26–27 September PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1 24 October Core Verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WFRS 26 October PIV 0 0 1 0 0 3
W0L1 7 November Interim inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF 9 November Interim 0 0 1 0 0 2
WNSC 22 November 3S Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WHEL 23 November 3S Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WNSC 29 November Environmental Sampling 1 1 1 1 1 2
WDJP 30 November PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0L2, W0LS 13 December Interim inspection 0 0 2 0 0 2
TVO HQ 22 December International transfers 0 0 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 19 21 42 29 36 62
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay, RII = Random Interim Inspection.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements con-
cerning safeguards of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear items in Finland (Finnish Treaty Series, 
FTS):
Treaties and international organisations 
in which Finland is a party:
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons; adopted in London, Moscow and 
Washington on 1 July 1968 (1970), INFCIRC/140 
(FTS 11/70).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 March 
1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	 the	 list	 in	At-
tachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	Eur-
atom Treaty, on determining concentrations of 
ores, 2 February 1960.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (FTS 
15/2001). This Treaty was ratified by Finland on 
January 15, 1999 but will not enter into force be-
fore it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II 
of the Treaty.
International Atomic Energy Agency (since 
1958).
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (since 
1976).
International Energy Agency (since 1992).
Safeguards Agreements based on 
Non-Proliferation Treaty:
The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and 
(4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 1973. 
Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between 
the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the 
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Kingdom of Netherlands, the Portuguese 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of 
Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Implementation of Article iii, (1) and (4) of the 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
22 September 1998. Entered into force on 30 April 
2004.
Finland is party among others to the 
following international conventions (the 
year when the convention entered into 
force for Finland is given in brackets):
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material; opened for signature in Vienna and New 
York on 3 March 1980 (1989).
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 
Accident; opened for signature in Vienna on 26 
September 1986 (1987).
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency; opened for 
signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (1990).
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy; adopted in Paris on 29 July 1960 
(1972).
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APPENDIX 3 InternatIonal agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards In fInland
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention 
of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Brussels on 31 
January 1963 (1977).
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field 
of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material; adopted 
in Brussels on 17 December 1971 (1991).
The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application 
of the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention; 
adopted in Vienna on 21 September 1988 (1995).
Convention on Nuclear Safety; opened for signa-
ture in Vienna on 20 September 1994 (1996).
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management, adopted on 29 September 
1997 in Vienna (2001).
Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement 
in Connection with Radiation Accidents; adopted 
in Vienna on 17 October 1963 (1965) Agreement on 
common Nordic guidelines on communications con-
cerning the siting of nuclear installations in border 
areas; adopted on 15 November1976 (1976).
The Agreement between Finland and Sweden on 
the guidelines to be followed while exporting nu-
clear material, technology or equipment, 4 March 
1983 (FTS 20/1983).
Agreements relating to early notification of nu-
clear events and exchange of information on 
safety of nuclear facilities with Denmark (1987), 
Norway (1987), Sweden (1987), Germany (1993), 
the Russian Federation (1996) and Ukraine (1996).
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessments 
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991)
As of 1 January 1995, Finland has 
been a member of the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom). Consequently, the following 
agreements are applied in Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of 
Republic of Finland and the Government of 
Canada and Canada concerning the uses of nu-
clear materials, equipment, facilities and infor-
mation transferred between Finland and Canada 
(FTS 43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent 
by the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 
6 October 1959, as amended.
The Agreement between the Government of 
Republic of Finland and the Government of 
Australia concerning the transfer of nuclear ma-
terial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
ty concerning transfer of nuclear material from 
Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community, 21 September 1981.
The Agreement for Cooperation with the 
Government of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic Energy 
Community and the USA, 12 April 1996.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government of 
Japan, 27 February 2006.
The Agreement Between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, 28 April 2005.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 December 2006.
Bilateral Safeguards Agreements 
made by Finland:
The Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 
1.1.2015 (FTS 5/2015).
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The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 
6.4.2015 (FTS 32/2015).
The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the Government of the Republic of Finland, en-
tered into force on 3.6.2017 (FTS 48/2017).
The Agreement with the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III and X expired 
on 20 February 1999.
The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) and 
the Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-
operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
(FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 expired on 
1.12.2004.
The Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the 
Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 41/70). Articles 
1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
The Agreement on implementation of the 
Agreement with Finland and Canada concerning 
the uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland and 
Canada (FTS 43/84).
